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Retroactive Application of California

Civil Code Section 4800.1: Procedural
Rule or Violation of Due Process?
California law recognizes two categories of property held by a husband and wife: the separate property of each, and the community
property of both.' The California Civil Code defines separate property as all property owned by a spouse before marriage or acquired
during marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, including the
rents, issues, and profits thereof.2 All other property acquired during
marriage is classified as community property.3 Upon marital dissolution, the separate property of a spouse remains the separate property
of that spouse,' while community property is divided equally between
the spouses.' For purposes of property division upon dissolution of
marriage or legal separation, the classification of the marital property
as community or as separate property has a significant effect upon
the amount of property each spouse receives.
California courts characterize property as separate or community
through the application of one or more rebuttable presumptions. 6
Among these is a presumption set forth by California Civil Code section 4800.1, which became effective on January 1, 1984. Section 4800.1
provides that any property acquired in joint tenancy form during marriage is presumed to be community property for purposes of division
of property at dissolution of marriage or legal separation. 7 The
presumption is rebuttable only by written evidence indicating the
spouses agreed the joint tenancy property was to remain separate.8
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

McCall v. McCall, 2 Cal. App. 2d 92, 94, 37 P.2d 496, 497 (1934).
CAL. CIV. CODE §§5107, 5108.
Id. §687.
See id. §§4351, 4800(a), 5102.
Id. §4800(a).
6. See 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORN A LAW, Community Property §§40-51 (8th
ed. 1974).
7. CAL. CIV. CODE §4800.1.
8. Section 4800.1 provides:
This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted
by either of the following:
(a) A clear statement in the deed or other documentary evidence of title by which
the property is acquired that the property is separate property and not community
property.
(b) Proof that the parties have made a written agreement that the property is separate
property.
CAL. CIV. CODE §4800.1.
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Prior to the enactment of section 4800.1, the characterization presumptions could be overcome by evidence of an oral agreement or an
understanding that the property was to remain separate. 9
In enacting section 4800.1, the legislature indicated the new law
was intended to apply retroactively. '" If section 4800.1 is applied
retroactively to joint tenancy property that formerly would have been
characterized upon dissolution as the separate property of one spouse
pursuant to an oral agreement or an understanding, the property
becomes part of the community. An oral agreement or an understanding, previously sufficient to rebut the characterization presumption,
is now insufficient to rebut the community property presumption of
section 4800.1." If section 4800.1 is applied as enacted, California
courts must characterize the property as community and divide the
property equally between the spouses instead of awarding the property to one spouse as separate property.' 2 For example, assume in 1983
husband and wife purchased a home with the separate funds of the
wife. Although title was taken in joint tenancy, the parties orally agreed
the property was to remain the separate property of the wife in the
event of divorce. The oral agreement, which would have been sufficient to rebut the presumption of community property under the former
law, would be insufficient to rebut the presumption of section 4800.1.
Upon dissolution, if section 4800.1 is applied retroactively, the
previously valid oral agreement between the parties becomes completely
ineffectual and the property is characterized as community property.
Due to the retroactive application of section 4800.1, the husband would
be awarded one-half the value of the property for which he contributed nothing, and the wife would be deprived of one-half of her
formerly separate property.
This author will discuss whether the alteration of property rights
by retroactive application of section 4800.1 constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law. First, the
law that applied prior to the enactment of section 4800.1 as well as
the changes produced by the addition of section 4800.1 to the California Civil Code will be examined.' 3 Next, the nature and effect of
retroactive application of law as construed by California courts will
be addressed." To discern the appropriate constitutional analysis, the
9. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
10. REPORT OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY ON ASSEMBLY BILL 26, 1983 SENATE J.,
4867, §4 (uncodified) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
11. Id. at 4865-66.
12. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§4351, 4800(a), 5102.
13. See infra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
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development of California law pertaining to the constitutionality of
retroactive application of marital property law will be traced.' 5 This
author will suggest a balancing test as the proper method of constitutional analysis. 6 After analyzing the conflicting approaches used by
the courts that have addressed the constitutional ramifications of
retroactive application of section 4800.1, this author will conclude
that retroactive application of section 4800.1, precluding the use of
oral agreements or the use of understandings to rebut the characterization presumptions, results in an unconstitutional deprivation of
property without due process of law.' 7 Since an understanding of the
effect of section 4800.1 is necessary to conduct the constitutional
analysis, the first section examines the prior law and the changes
engendered by section 4800.1.
CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW PRIOR TO SECTION 4800.1
Prior to the enactment of section 4800.1, for purposes of marital
dissolution, the characterization of property acquired during marriage
in joint tenancy was determined by the application of one of two
rebuttable presumptions.' 8 The form-of-title presumption provided that
the ownership interest in property was presumed to be as stated in
the written instrument of title.' 9 For example, property purchased during marriage with community funds, but held by a husband and wife
in joint tenancy, was presumed to be joint tenancy property.
In 1965, the California Legislature partially modified the common
law form-of-title presumption by adding a provision to Civil Code
section 164.20 The new provision created a special presumption that
overcame the form-of-title presumption when applied to a single family
residence.' Under section 5110, the successor to section 164, for purposes of division of property upon dissolution of marriage or legal
separation, a single family residence acquired during marriage by a
husband and wife as joint tenants was presumed to be community
property."2 The effect of the new provision was to change the presump15. See infra notes 53-98 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 106-74 and accompanying text.
18. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 813-14, 614 P.2d 285, 287-88, 166 Cal. Rptr.
853, 856-57 (1980).
19. Id. at 813, 614 P.2d at 287, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
20. In 1969, section 164 was repealed and replaced by section 5110, which contains nearly
identical language. See Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 814 n.2, 614 P.2d at 288 n.2, 166 Cal. Rptr.
at 856-57 n.2. This comment will refer to section 5110 in future references to this provision.
21. CAL. CIV. CODE §5110.
22. Id.
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tive form of ownership to one more closely matching the intent and
assumptions of most spouses who acquire and hold their residence
in joint tenancy.2 3
The form-of-title presumption was rebuttable by evidence of an oral
or written agreement or an understanding between the parties that
the ownership interest in the property was other than as stated in
the title.2 4 In 1980, the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage
of Lucas,2 5 held that the same strength and type of evidence necessary
to rebut the form-of-title presumption was necessary to overcome the
single-family-residence presumption of section 5110.26 Since both
presumptions arose from the form of title in which the property was
held, the same evidentiary standard was required to rebut the
presumptions. 27
In 1983, the California Legislature substantially altered the laws
pertaining to the characterization of all joint tenancy property at
dissolution. In that year, Assembly Bill 26 was passed, which added
section 4800.1 to the California Civil Code.2 8 Section 4800.1 alters
the presumptions applicable to property held in joint tenancy and
changes the burden of proof necessary to rebut the presumption of
community property that arises from the joint tenancy form of title.
FUNCTION AND EFFECT OF SECTION

4800.1

Section 4800.1 eliminates the form-of-title presumption that property
acquired by a husband and wife in joint tenancy form during marriage is joint tenancy property.2 9 For purposes of division of property
upon dissolution of marriage or legal separation, the new statute creates
a presumption that property acquired by a husband and wife in joint
tenancy form during marriage is community property.3 0 The new law
expands the existing single-family-residence presumption of section 5110
to include all property acquired in joint tenancy form during
marriage."
23. FINAL REPORT OF ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY RELATING TO DOMESTIC
RELATIONS, 124-25, 1965 APPEND. TO AssEm& J. [hereinafter cited as Domssnc RELATIONS REPORT].
24. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 813, 614 P.2d at 287, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 856 (1980).
25. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853.
26. Id. at 814, 614 P.2d at 288, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
27. Id. at 814-15, 614 P.2d at 288, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
28. A.B. 26 also added section 4800.2 to the Civil Code. 1983 Cal. Stat. c. 342, §2, at
-.
An analysis of the constitutional ramifications of retroactive application of section 4800.2
is beyond the scope of this comment.
29. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4866.
30. Id.
31. Id. The single-family-residence presumption of section 5110 is superseded by section
4800.1 and the applicable provision of section 5110 was deleted when section 4800.1 was added.
Id. at 4867.
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The statute states that the presumption affects the burden of proof
and can be rebutted only by a clear statement in the deed or other
written instrument of title that the property is separate and not community, or by evidence of a written agreement that the property is
separate property.3" The evidentiary requirement necessary to rebut
the presumption set forth in section 4800.1 supersedes the requirement set forth in Lucas.3 3 No longer will evidence of an oral agreement or an understanding between the parties be sufficient to rebut
the presumption that applies to joint tenancy property. Section 4800.1
requires the evidence to be in writing.3"
The legislature expressly stated that section 4800.1 was intended
to apply retroactively.3 5 The new law applies to "[plroceedings commenced on or after January 1, 1984," and to "[p]roceedings commenced before January 1, 1984, to the extent proceedings as to the
division of the property are not yet final on January 1, 1984." 36 This
provision has been interpreted by California courts to denote the new
law applies to property acquired before the enactment of section 4800.1
at a time when the controlling law was set forth by section 5110 as
interpreted by Lucas, and by the form-of-title presumptions.3 7
Substantial controversy has developed concerning the constitutional
validity of retroactive application of section 4800.1. Among the factors contributing to this controversy is confusion in California courts
regarding the circumstances in which retroactive application of law
requires constitutional scrutiny. In making the determination of whether
retroactive application of a law is constitutional, an important consideration is the nature of the law and the effect of retroactive application of the law.3 8
RETROACTVTY
A discriminating analysis of the constitutional validity of retroactive legislation necessarily entails defining retroactivity in terms of the
effect upon the rights altered by retroactive application of a law.39
The types of effect form a spectrum in which the seriousness of the
impairment of the rights affected varies. At one end of the spectrum
32.

33.

CAL. CIV. CODE §4800.1.
SENATE REPORT, supra note

10, at 4865-66.

34. Id. at 4866.
35. Id. at 4867.

36. 1983 Cal. Stat. c. 342, §4, at
37. In re Marriage of Neal, 153 Cal. App. 3d 117, 123-25, 200 Cal. Rptr. 341, 345-46 (1984).

38. See Reppy, Retroactivity of the 1975 California Community Property Reforms, 48 S.
REv. 977, 986 (1975).

CAL. L.

39. Id. at 986.
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is interest-shifting retroactivity, from which the most extreme impairment of individual rights results.4" When a change in law shifts the
ownership of property from one party to another, a significant deprivation of property results and constitutional requirements must be
satisfied. 4'
At the other end of the spectrum is the retroactive application of
rules of evidence and rules of procedure, in which no vested right
can exist. 2 The retroactive application of changes in rules of procedure or evidence creates a relatively insignificant retroactive effect. 3
Since no vested rights can exist in the rules, the legislature generally
can alter rules of procedure or evidence and apply the changes retroactively to rights that accrued prior to the change. 4 Substantive rules,
unlike rules of procedure or evidence, cannot be changed retroactively without a consideration of possible constitutional violations.45
The distinction between purely procedural rules and substantive rules,
however, is unclear.4 6 The distinction depends upon the effect of the
rule rather than the form. 7 A law that ordinarily would be classified
as procedural may seriously affect substantive rights." For example,
the legislature cannot, by a purported change in procedure, eliminate
all means to enforce or protect a right. 9 Unless a reasonably efficient remedy is left to enforce a right, the substantive right is
impaired. 0
If a law alters purely procedural or evidentiary rules without affecting substantive rights, the law can be applied retroactively and no
constitutional issue arises." If substantive rights are impaired, however,
even by a law that appears to be procedural or evidentiary, the law
must undergo constitutional scrutiny.52 The California courts have
developed constitutional standards to determine whether retroactive
application of community property laws satisfy the constitutional
requirements.
40. Id. at 987.
41. Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 448, 457, 535 P.2d 713, 718, 121 Cal. Rptr.
585, 590 (1975).
42. See 5 B. vrrx, StummAJY oF CAumo-usA LAW, ConstitutionalLaw §285 (8th ed. 1974).
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See Nelson v. A. H. Robins Co., 149 Cal. App. 3d 862, 870-71, 197 Cal. Rptr. 179,
184 (1983).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 5 B. WTK N, supra note 42, §286.
50. Id.
51. See id. §285.
52. See Reppy, supra note 38, at 1047-52; 5 B. WVncKIN, supra note 42, §282.
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RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY
LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD

Retroactive application of law traditionally has been viewed by the
courts with suspicion and hostility.5 3 As a result, a judicial rule of
construction has developed prohibiting retroactive application unless
the legislature manifested a clear intent to the contrary. 54 If the court
determines that the legislature intended the law to apply retroactively, the law generally will be deemed invalid only if the application
contravenes a specific constitutional provision. 5 Retroactive community
property laws that impair property rights commonly are challenged
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution and the California constitutional counterpart, article I, section 7. Both provide that a state cannot deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.5 6
In California, the appropriate standard for application of due pro7
cess requirements to retroactive community property laws is unclear.1
Older California opinions reveal a judicial approach based upon the
determination of whether the rights affected were vested."8 More recent
California courts, while not specifically overruling the older approach,
have applied a test in which the interests of the state are balanced
against the right impaired."
The Vested Right Approach

A.

Historically, legislation has been held to violate due process if
retroactive application either deprived a person of a vested property
right6" or substantially impaired that right.6" The origin of the vested
53. Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEXAs L. REv. 231, 234 (1927).
54. In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 586, 546 P.2d 1371, 1372-73, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 427, 428-29 (1976).

55.

Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation,

73 HARV. L. REv. 692, 693-94 (1960).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1; CAL. CONST. art. I, §7.

57. See generally Laughran, Management and Control of Community Property in California:
"Retroactive" Application of the 1975 Amendments, 9 Loy L.A.L. REv. 493, 502-43 (1976)

(discussion of the development of California law concerning retroactive application of community property law).
58. See infra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.
60. The precise meaning of the term "vested right" is unclear and the California courts
have used the term to mean different things in different contexts. Flournoy v. California, 230
Cal. App. 2d 520, 532, 41 Cal. Rptr. 190, 197 (1964). This author will use the term "vested
right" to mean a right that is proper for the state to recognize and protect, and of which
a person cannot be deprived without following established requirements of due process. See
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1402 (5th ed. 1979).

61.

Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 191 Cal. 601, 612, 218 P. 22, 26 (1923).
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right approach in California was the 1897 case of Spreckels v.
Spreckels. 2 The California Supreme Court in Spreckels considered
the constitutional validity of retroactive application of an amendment
to section 172 of the California Civil Code. Originally, section 172
provided that "[t]he husband has the management and control of community property, with the like power of disposition (other than
testamentary) as he has of his separate estate." ' 63 The amendment
restricted this section by providing that the husband could not make
a gift of or convey any community property without the written consent of the wife."" The court held the amendment could not apply
to vested property rights acquired prior to the effective date of the
amendment.6" Since the pre-amendment code created vested property
rights in the husband, retroactive application of the amendment would
have deprived the husband of those vested rights and would have been
an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of
law.66 The sole issue before the court, however, was whether the rights
conferred' 6 7upon the husband by the pre-amendment statute were
"vested.
Counsel for the wife admitted that if the husband was
the owner of the property, a statute that made the right to dispose
of the property subject to the will of another would be
unconstitutional. 68 The basis of the Spreckels vested right approach,
that retroactive application of law affecting the interest of a spouse
in community property would be an unconstitutional impairment of
vested property rights, was never actually argued, but was adopted
by the court on the basis of a concession of counsel.
Criticism of the Spreckels vested right approach by California courts
and commentators has been extensive. 69 The California Supreme Court
in Addison v. Addison70 noted the approach had been questioned and
the correctness of the doctrine was open to challenge. 7' Rather than
overrule Spreckels and later cases that endorsed the vested right approach, however, the Addison court decided the Spreckels approach
did not apply. 72
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

116 Cal. 339, 48 P.
Id. at 341, 48 P. at
Id.
Id. at 349, 48 P. at
Id.
Id. at 341, 48 P. at
Id. at 349, 48 P. at
Addison v. Addison,

228 (1897).
228.
231.
229.
231.
62 Cal. 2d 558, 565-66, 399 P.2d 897, 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97,

101 (1965).
70.
71.
72.
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In 1976, the California Supreme Court, in In re Marriage of
Bouquet,13 cast further doubt on the validity of the vested right approach. The Bouquet court, in addressing the constitutionality of
retroactive application of a community property law, did not even
mention Spreckels or its progeny, and applied the constitutional analysis
set forth in Addison.7 " Bouquet apparently affirmed what Addison
implied, that the conclusory application of the term "vested right,"
when used as a basis for constitutional analysis without further explanation, is inadequate as a constitutional doctrine." Addison and
Bouquet appear to signify that if modern California courts deem the
property right vested, the holder of that right has established a sufficient interest to warrant the application of the balancing process to
determine whether retroactive application of a law constitutes an un16
constitutional impairment of the property right.
B.

The Balancing Test

In Addison, the husband and wife moved to California in 1949,
retaining property husband had acquired as separate property in
Illinois." In California, under the quasi-community property legislation of 1961, separate property brought to California that would have
been community property if acquired by a California domiciliary, was
7
treated as community property at divorce for purposes of division. 1
After the legislation became effective, the wife obtained a divorce
and sought a division of the property acquired in Illinois." The California Supreme Court held that the 1961 legislation could be applied
constitutionally to transmute the formerly separate property of the
husband to community property for purposes of the property division.80
Addison rejected the allegation that application of the legislation
violated due process, stating that the husband had not been deprived
of a vested property right without due process.8 1 The court held that
vested rights may be impaired with due process of law under many
circumstances.8" Vested rights, the court said, can be impaired through
73. 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976).
74. Id. at 593, 546 P.2d at 1376-77, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
75. See Laughran, supra note 57, at 523-43.
76. Reppy, supra note 38, at 1050. The balancing process is discussed extensively in the
article by Hochman, supra note 55.
77. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d at 561, 399 P.2d at 898, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
78. Id. at 561 n.3, 399 P.2d at 898-99 n.3, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 98-99 n.3.
79. Id. at 561, 399 P.2d at 898, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
80. Id. at 567, 399 P.2d at 903, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 566, 399 P.2d at 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
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the exercise of the inherent sovereign power of the state whenever
reasonably necessary to the protection of the health, safety, morals,
and general welfare of the people.8 3 Addison held that the state has
a legitimate and important interest in the marital relationship, and
that these interests outweighed the impairment of the husband's rights,
even though the rights were vested.84 Thus no deprivation of property without due process occurred.
In Bouquet the issue before the court was whether the retroactive
application of an amendment to section 5118 of the Civil Code was
constitutional. 8 In 1971, the legislature amended section 5118 to provide that earnings and accumulations of either spouse, earned while
living separate and apart from the other spouse, were the separate
property of the earning spouse. 8 6 Prior to the amendment, the earnings and accumulations of the wife living separate and apart from
her spouse were considered separate property, but those of the husband were considered community property.87 The California Supreme
Court held that the retroactive application of section 5118 to the
earnings of the husband acquired from the date of separation to the
date of dissolution was constitutional and held the earnings to be his
separate property.8 8
The court stated that because the status of property as community
or separate is normally determined at the time of acquisition, the wife
gained vested property rights when, prior to the effective date of the
amendment, her husband earned income. 9 Although the retroactive
application of the amendment deprived the wife of vested rights, the
court held that the vesting of her property rights did not render them
immutable.9" Vested rights, according to the court, can be impaired
without violating due process if the change in the law is sufficiently
necessary to the public welfare to justify the impairment. 9 1
The Bouquet court set forth specific factors to be considered in
applying the balancing test. A primary consideration is the significance
of the state interest served by the law and the importance of retroactive application of the law to the effectuation of that interest. 92 Against

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

1016

Id.
Id. at 567, 399 P.2d at
Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 591, 546 P.2d at
Id. at 591-92, 546 P.2d
Id. at 592, 546 P.2d at
Id.

902, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
586, 546 P.2d at 1372, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 428.

1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
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these considerations the court weighs the extent of reliance upon the
former law, the legitimacy of that reliance, and the extent to which
the retroactive application of the new law would disrupt actions taken
in reliance upon the former law. 9"
Rather than apply these factors, however, the court stated that a
peculiar congruence existed between the factual pattern in Addison
and that in Bouquet.9 This similarity allowed the court to sustain
retroactive application of section 5118 based on the holding in Addison
with only minimal analysis. The court in both cases held that the
substantial interest of the state in the equitable distribution of martial
property upon dissolution of marriage justified the impairment of the
vested property rights. 9" The significance of the state interest was
enhanced greatly because the new legislation remedied the effects of
an unjust and inequitable former law. 96 Consequently, the court found
that because the divesture of the property of the wife in Bouquet
constituted no more a taking of property without due process of law
than that which occurred in Addison, the interest of the state in
equitable dissolution of the marital relationship warranted the
impairment. 97
The Bouquet and Addison decisions indicate that if the retroactive
application of a California community property law results in a serious
impairment of a vested property interest, the proper form of constitutional analysis is the balancing test. The balancing test weighs the
severity of impairment of rights against the state interests promoted
by retroactive application of the law. A relatively serious impairment
of rights is not constitutionally prohibited if a sufficiently important
state interest warrants the impairment. 9 The appropriate inquiry with
respect to section 4800.1, therefore, is whether the state interest promoted by retroactive application of section 4800.1 is sufficient to warrant the resulting impairment of property rights.
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF SECTION 4800.1
Section 4800.1 provides that, for purposes of division of property
at dissolution of marriage or legal separation, any property acquired
93.
94.
95.
96.
former
former
at 594,
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 594, 546 P.2d at 1378, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
Id.
Id. at 594 n.11, 546 P.2d at 1377 n.11, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433 n.11. In Addison the
law left the innocent party unprotected. Id. In Bouquet the injustice caused by the
law was the discrimination against the husband during the period of separation. Id.
546 P.2d at 1377, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
Id. at 594, 546 P.2d at 1378, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
See Reppy, supra note 38, at 1048-49.
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in joint tenancy form during marriage is presumed to be community.99
The presumption is rebuttable only by written evidence indicating the
joint tenancy property was intended to remain separate property.100
Prior to the enactment of section 4800.1, the characterization presumptions could be rebutted by evidence of an oral agreement or understanding that the property was to remain separate.' If, upon dissolution, section 4800.1 is applied retroactively to property that formerly
would have been characterized as the separate property of one spouse
pursuant to an oral understanding, the character of the property is
10 2
changed to community for purposes of property division.
When this change in character alters the results of the property
division by shifting the property rights from one spouse to the other,
due process requirement must be satisfied.0 3 The California appellate
courts that have considered whether retroactive application of section
4800.1 constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of property, however,
have not applied the balancing test.'04 In addition, the appelate courts
that have addressed the problem have produced inconsistent holdings
on substantially similar facts. 1°5
A.

California Appellate Court Decisions

In the case of In re Marriageof Martinez,"6 the First District Court
of Appeal specifically addressed whether retroactive application of section 4800.1 was constitutional. Property was transferred to the husband and the wife as joint tenants from the parents of the husband. 0 7
In the dissolution action, the trial court held that the property was
the separate property of the husband because of an oral understanding between the parties that the property was to remain his separate
property.' 0 The trial court found that Lucas controlled and allowed
99. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Neal, 153 Cal. App. 3d 117, 200 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1984);
In re Marriage of Martinez, 156 Cal. App. 3d 20, 202 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1984).
103. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 106-52 and accompanying text. The cases that are presented for discussion in this comment all concern the changes produced by section 4800.1 when the single-familyresidence presumption of section 5110 was the former controlling law. Therefore, the constitutional analysis will be presented in that context. Id. The same analysis applies, however, if
the form-of-title presumption controlled prior to the application of section 4800.1 and if an
oral agreement or understanding existed in which the parties agreed that the property at issue
was to remain the separate property of one spouse.
105. See infra notes 106-52 and accompanying text.
106. 156 Cal. App. 3d 20, 202 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1984).
107. Id. at 25, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
108. Id. at 26, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
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the parties to rebut the presumption that the property was community
by an oral understanding.' 9 The wife appealed the decision, challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut the presumption of community
property under newly enacted section 4800.1.110
The appellate court held that retroactive application of section
4800.1, which required a writing to rebut the community property
presumption, was constitutional and reversed the trial court. According to the court, the resulting change in the characterization of the
property from the separate property of the husband to community
property did not deprive the husband of vested property rights without
due process. I ' The court reasoned that no interference with vested
rights occurred; the statute merely altered the evidentiary burden of
proof in cases in which a husband and wife take property in joint
tenancy form." 2
Three months later, the Second District Court of Appeal came down
with a position directly opposite Martinez on substantially similar facts.
In In re Marriage of Milse,"13 the wife made the down payment on
a home with her separate funds and took title in joint tenancy with
her husband." 4 The trial court found that an oral understanding existed between the parties that the house was to remain the separate
property of the wife.' At the time of trial, Lucas provided that the
single-family-residence presumption of section 5110 could be overcome
by an oral agreement."16 Accordingly, the trial court held that the
' 7
house was the separate property of the wife.
While the appeal was pending, section 4800.1 was enacted. On appeal, the husband contended that section 4800.1 applied retroactively
and required a writing to rebut the presumption that the house was
separate." ' Unlike Martinez, the appellate court held retroactive application of section 4800.1 to the circumstances in Milse would constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of a vested property right
without due process of law.
The court reasoned that the wife's rights in the property became

109. Id. at 28, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
110. Id. at 24, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
111. Id. at 30, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
112. Id.
113. 159 Cal. App. 3d 471, 205 Cal. Rptr. 616, hrg. granted, Nov. 21, 1984 (L.A.
32004) (1984).
114. Id. at 473-74, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
115. Id. at 474, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 475, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
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vested at the time of the oral agreement."19 When the oral agreement
was made and at the trial date, no written agreement was required.11°
The court stated that the injustice of changing the evidentiary requirements after the opportunity to meet those requirements had passed
was "too obvious to require discussion."''
The Milse court noted that section 4800.1, on its face, purports
to enact a change in the law of evidence.' 2 2 The court, however, found
that when applied to the facts of the case, the presumption of section 4800.1 became conclusive.' 2 3 The application of the conclusive
presumption, therefore, effectively would overrule even the most clearly
expressed oral agreement of husband and wife, made at a time when
the agreements were accorded full recognition.' 24 Since application of
the purportedly procedural rule cut off all legal remedy, the resulting
abrogation of previously vested property rights was the "clearest sort
of due process denial."' 2 5 Consequently, section 4800.1 could not apply
26
retroactively.'
Although the holding in Milse expressly was limited to the specific
facts before the court, Martinez presented substantially similar facts
and identical issues.' 27 The divergence in the opinions, therefore, cannot
be distinguished by a factual analysis. The holdings clearly are inconsistent. In fact, the Milse opinion specifically acknowledged the con28
flict and did not attempt to distinguish the opinions.
The inconsistency in the opinions may be explained by examining
the extent to which each court analyzed the section 4800.1 due process question. The Martinez decision was based upon a conclusion
that section 4800.1 merely altered the evidentiary burden of proof.'2 9
The distinction, however, between rules of evidence or procedure and
substantive rules depends upon the effect of the rule rather than the
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id., 205 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
124. Id.
125. Id., 205 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
126. Id.
127. In both cases, an oral agreement or understanding existed in which the character of
the separate property of one spouse was to remain separate. See supra notes 108, 115 and

accompanying text. The title to the property was taken in joint tenancy. See supra notes 107,
114 and accompanying text.
128. Milse, 159 Cal. App. 3d at 476, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
129. Martinez, 156 Cal. App. at 30, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 653. The court discussed other
"pertinent factors" in the decision, but the factors were discussed in the context of whether

section 4800.1 was intended to apply retroactively, not in the context of whether retroactive
application was constitutional. Id. at 29-30, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 652-53. The factors concerned
the benefits of retroactive application of section 4800.1 rather than the former law. Id.
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form. 3 ° The court apparently dismissed the due process challenge
without considering the actual effect on the property rights of the
husband.
The court in Milse took the analysis one step further by considering the effect of retroactive application of section 4800.1. In both
cases, retroactive application created a burden of proof that could
not possibly be met. At the time of the agreement, the parties did
not know a written agreement would be required by the subsequent
enactment of a retroactive law. The effect was to divest the affected
parties in both cases of property rights that vested when the oral
13
agreements between the spouses were made. '
Although the Milse court correctly extended the constitutional
analysis beyond the form of section 4800.1 and considered the effect
of the statute on substantive rights, the analysis nevertheless may not
have been complete. The Milse court held that the injustice of retroactive application of section 4800.1 to the facts of the case was "too
obvious to require discussion" and "constituted the clearest sort of
due process denial.""' Bouquet and Addison, however, indicate that
impairment of vested property rights by retroactive application of community property law is not per se unconstitutional.133 Under the Bouquet analysis, the retroactive application of section 4800.1 would not
be a clear due process violation. The Milse court should have finished
the analysis with a determination of whether the state interest promoted by retroactive application of section 4800.1 warranted the impairment of property rights.
Shortly after Milse and Martinez were decided, the constitutional
propriety of retroactive application of section 4800.1 was again addressed in In re Marriageof Taylor."31 In Taylor, the trial court held
that the parties had an oral understanding that a house purchased
35
with the separate funds of the husband was to remain separate.
Under the controlling law set forth in Lucas, the oral understanding
was sufficient to rebut the single-family-residence presumption of section 5110.136 In reversing the trial court decision, the appellate court
followed the Martinez analysis and held that the retroactive applica137
tion of section 4800.1 was not unconstitutional.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
Milse, 159 Cal. App. 3d at 475, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
Id.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
160 Cal. App. 3d 471, 206 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1984).
Id. at 473, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 474, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
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The dissenting judge challenged the validity of the procedural rule
analysis relied upon by the majority and concluded that the retroactive application of section 4800.1 deprived the husband of his separate
property without due process of law.138 The dissent argued that the
interest of the husband in the home was a separate property interest,
the status of which was determined at the time of acquisition. 39 Once
property is acquired, the owner has a vested right that cannot be taken
by the government without due process of law. 40 Therefore, since
separate property funds of the husband were used to acquire the house
and the lot, his vested separate property interest could not be taken
without following the dictates of due process.' 4' The dissent argued
that the legislature enacted a rule of evidence with which the parties
could not possibly comply because they could not go back in time
to create the missing written agreement.' 2 The dissenting opinion indicated, however, that the impairment of the vested property rights
of the husband was not per se unconstitutional.'4 3 Citing Bouquet,
the dissent stated that the legislature may impair vested property rights
without violating due process, provided retroactive application
is
44
necessary to serve a sufficiently important state interest.
Applying the analysis set forth in Bouquet, the Taylor dissent noted
that retroactive application of a statute affecting vested property rights
generally has been upheld to remedy a "rank injustice of former
law.""' 5 The dissenting judge argued that section 4800.1 remedied no
comparable unfairness.' 46 No manifest unfairness existed in the rule
of Lucas that allowed the husband to retain his separate property
interest in a lot and residence financed solely with his separate funds
in accordance with the contemporaneous oral understanding of the
parties. 4
In addition, the dissent concluded that rather than serving a state
interest, the retroactive application of section 4800.1 actually impairs
an important state interest.' 48 According to the dissent, the majority
deprived the husband of his separate property interest although he

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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Id. at 475, 206 Cal. Rptr. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at 475-76, 206 Cal. Rptr.
Id. at 476-77, 206 Cal. Rptr.
Id. at 477, 206 Cal. Rptr. at
Id.
Id., 206 Cal. Rptr. at 561-62.
Id. at 478, 206 Cal. Rptr. at
Id.
Id.

560.

at 560.
at 561.
561.
562.
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fully complied with the controlling law at the time he acted. 49 The
result was obviously at odds with the interest of the state in obtaining an equitable distribution of marital property upon dissolution. 50
Consequently, the dissent concluded that the serious impairment of
vested property rights of the husband was not supported by a sufficiently important state interest and that the majority deprived the husband of his separate property without due process of law.' 5 ' The dissent recommended that section 4800.1 be limited to cases in which
the property has been acquired in joint tenancy on or after the effective date of the section, January 1, 1984.152
The inconsistencies in the opinions that have addressed the due process issue raised by retroactive application of section 4800.1 apparently
are due to two factors. The first factor is the failure of some courts
to look beyond the procedural form of section 4800.1 and, as a result,
the failure to consider the serious impairment of substantive rights
caused by retroactive application. These courts dismissed the allegation of a deprivation of property by concluding that since the retroactive application of section 4800.1 merely effectuated a change in a
rule of evidence in which no vested rights can exist, no vested rights
were impaired. The actual effect of increasing the burden of proof
necessary to rebut the community property presumption, however, was
to make the presumption conclusive because the parties could not
possibly meet the writing requirement after the time for creating the
writing had passed. Retroactive application of the requirement of a
writing to rebut the community property presumption abrogated
formerly valid oral agreements and shifted property interests from
one spouse to the other. This serious impairment of substantive rights
requires further constitutional scrutiny.
The second factor contributing to the inconsistencies in California
case law concerns the appropriate form of constitutional analysis to
apply once an impairment of a substantive right has been found. Notwithstanding the positions taken by the California Supreme Court in
Addison and Bouquet, vestiges of the Spreckels vested right approach
continue to plague California law. A review of the development and
current state of law demonstrates that, although Spreckels was never
expressly overruled, the vested right approach is no longer sound constitutional doctrine. 5 3 Once a sufficiently important substantive right
149.

Id.

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id. at 479, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
Id.
See supra notes 53-75 and accompanying text.
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has been impaired, the appropriate form of constitutional analysis
is the balancing test set forth in Bouquet."' When section 4800.1 is
applied retroactively to classify formerly separate property as community in spite of an oral agreement to the contrary, vested property
rights are impaired and the balancing test is required.
B.

Balancing Test Considerations

The Bouquet test is essentially a broad balancing process.' First,
the court considers the significance of the state interest served by the
law and the importance of retroactive application of the law to the
effectuation of that interest.'5 6 If an important state interest can be
effectuated only through retroactive application of the law, the
strongest case for constitutionality of retroactivity exists. 5 Against
the state interest considerations the court weighs the extent of reliance
upon the former law, the legitimacy of the reliance, and the extent
to which retroactive application of the new law disrupts action taken
based upon that reliance.' 5 8 If a party substantially relied upon the
former law, the reliance was legitimate, and retroactive application
of the new law completely destroys the value of the reliance, the
strongest case against retroactive application of a change in the law
exists.' 9
The existence of a significant state interest in regulation of marriage and marital property rights is unquestioned. 6 ' This interest includes the protection of the property interests of the parties upon
dissolution of marriage.' 6 ' Section 4800.1 was enacted to promote the
interest of the state in fair and just distribution of marital property
at dissolution and to alleviate the inconsistency in the case law dealing with the proper characterization of marital property.'6 2 The retroactive application of section 4800.1 to cases in which the parties reached
an oral agreement or an understanding concerning the disposition of
joint tenancy property clearly impairs both these interests.
154. See supra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
156. Id.
157. See Reppy, supra note 38, at 1048-49.
158. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
159. See Reppy, supra note 39, at 1048.
160. See Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 567, 399 P.2d 897, 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102 (1965).
161. Id. (quoting Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942)).
162. California Law Revision Commission, Recommendation Relating to Division of Joint
Tenancy and Tenancy in Common Property at Dissolution of Marriage, 16 CAL. L. RavisioN
COMM'N REPORTS

2165, 2170 (1970). The interest of the state in equitable distribution of marital

property appears to be the goal of all marital property division laws. See Bouquet, 16 Cal.
3d at 593, 546 P.2d at 1378, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
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To achieve a fair and just distribution of property at dissolution,
the state is obligated to protect separate property interests as well
as community property interests.' 63 Retroactive application of section
4800.1 promotes the property interests of the community at the expense of the separate property interest. The law penalizes a party with
separate property for the inability to -foretell the future enactment
of a law that requires a writing to rebut the community property
presumption. A law that deprives a party of separate property even
though the party fully complied with the then current controlling law
does not promote the state interest in fair and just distribution of
marital property.
Section 4800.1 also seeks to alleviate the inconsistency and unpredic64
tability that has resulted from application of the Lucas standard.'
By requiring a writing to rebut the community property presumption,
the new law applies a more reliable test by which to determine the
understanding and expectations of the parties.' 6 5 The more reliable
66
test supplies a clear standard by which to reach consistent results.'
To the extent section 4800.1 is applied retroactively, however, the interest in consistency is thwarted. Retroactive application of section
4800.1 has resulted repeatedly in the reversal of trial court decisions
based upon Lucas. 6 7 In addition, the inconsistency produced by Lucas
has been replaced by the inconsistency in the opinions concerning the
constitutionality of retroactive application of section 4800.1.' 68
Even if retroactive application of section 4800.1 promotes these interests, the California Supreme Court has indicated that, standing
alone, these interests are not sufficient to outweigh a serious impairment of property rights. In Addison and Bouquet, the critical factor
in favor of retroactive application of the changes in community
property law was the alleviation of a serious inequity caused by the
former law.' 6 9 Since the former law was unjust, the prevention of
7
the resulting harm weighed heavily in favor of retroactive application.' 1
Section 4800.1 alleviates no comparable injustice. The rule of Lucas
163. Since the duty of the court is to determine what property is community property and
what property is separate property, if fair and just distribution of property at dissolution is
the goal, both the separate and community interests must be protected. See 7 B. WrrKIN, supra

note 6, §§98, 100.
164. See Martinez, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 28, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Neal, 153 Cal. App. 3d 117, 200 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1984);
In re Marriage of Anderson, 154 Cal. App. 3d 572, 201 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1984).
168. See supra notes 106-52 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
170. Id.
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that allowed married persons to arrange their property interests through
unwritten agreements or through understandings as to the character
of their property created no inherent unfairness. Since retroactive application of section 4800.1 remedies no serious injustice, the general
interest of the state in the fair distribution of property and reduction
of inconsistency in the cases lends little support to the constitutionality
of retroactive application.
The factors that weigh against retroactive application are the extent and the legitimacy of reliance upon the former law and the extent to which retroactive application of the new law disrupts action
taken based upon that reliance. The United States and California Constitutions say nothing specifically to guarantee that reliance by an individual on the civil law will be protected, yet nothing seems more
basic to the existence of a viable legal system than the ability of its
members to rely upon the law with confidence. 7' Since the fourteenth
amendment specifically guarantees the right to property without arbitrary impairment, reliance upon laws that protect property rights
is legitimate in the absence of factors suggesting otherwise. The California Supreme Court impliedly supported this contention in Bouquet.
The Bouquet court did not address the legitimacy of reliance as a
factor in the balancing test except in a footnote.' The footnote only
stated that the unfairness of the former law casts doubt upon the
legitimacy of reliance upon the former law.' The language of the
footnote implies that the court presumes reliance upon community
property law is legitimate unless some factor, such as the injustice
of the law, suggests otherwise. Since section 4800.1 remedies no comparable injustice, the Bouquet decision indicates that reliance upon
Lucas was legitimate.
The retroactive application of section 4800.1 to abrogate previously valid oral agreements or understandings results in a total disruption of actions taken in reliance upon the former law. If no writing
exists to rebut the community property presumption, then the parties
were relying completely upon an oral agreement or upon an understanding to provide a basis for characterization of the property at dissolution. The result is the most extreme form of impairment of a property right because the interest in the property is shifted from one party
to another solely by application of the new law. 74
171. Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerationsin Retroactive Lawmaking, 48
CAip. L. REv. 216, 225 (1960).
172. Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d at 594 n.11, 546 P.2d at 1377 n.11, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433 n.11.
173. Id.
174. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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Retroactive application of section 4800.1 invalidates oral agreements
and understandings arrived at in legitimate reliance upon a fair and
just former law. The result is a total deprivation of vested property
rights. When all the factors are considered, the state interests do not
outweigh the complete abrogation of property rights, and the retroactive application of section 4800.1 results in an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law.
CONCLUSION

This author has examined whether the retroactive application of
section 4800.1 of the California Civil Code constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law. After reviewing the nature and effect of retroactive laws, this author suggested
that the proper constitutional doctrine is a balancing of the state interest to be promoted by the new law against the right impaired by
retroactive application of that law. The balancing test, however, has
not been applied by the appellate courts that have addressed this constitutional issue. These cases have produced conflicting holdings on
substantially similar facts. If section 4800.1 is applied retroactively
to require a writing to rebut the community property presumption
in cases in which an oral agreement or an understanding existed regarding the nature of a marital property interest, an impossible burden.
of proof is created. This author has concluded that the resulting shift
of property interest is an unconstitutional deprivation of property
without due process of law. To remedy this potential constitutional
violation, California courts should apply section 4800.1 only to property acquired after the effective date of the statute, January 1, 1984,
or allow evidence of oral agreements or understandings made prior
to the effective date of the statute to rebut the community property
presumption of section 4800.1.
Gary W. Duhon
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